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Abstract—The development of fully automated vehicles im-
poses new challenges in the development process and during the
operation of such vehicles. As traditional design methods are
not sufficient to account for the huge variety of scenarios which
will be encountered by (fully) automated vehicles, approaches for
designing safe systems must be extended in order to allow for an
ISO 26262 compliant development process. During operation of
vehicles implementing SAE Levels 3+ safe behavior must always
be guaranteed, as the human driver is not or not immediately
available as a fall-back. Thus, the vehicle must be aware of
its current performance and remaining abilities at all times. In
this paper we combine insights from two research projects for
showing how a skill- and ability-based approach can provide
a basis for the development phase and operation of self-aware
automated road vehicles.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent years have shown a growing trend towards
the development of automated vehicles in the automotive
industry. Research institutions as well as original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) and startup companies are working
towards the market introduction of vehicles which are ca-
pable of taking over the whole driving task without or with
little supervision of the human driver. Results from different
research projects and already available partially automated
driving systems (nomenclature according to SAE standard
J3016 [1]) show potential customer benefit. However, all of
the recently presented automated vehicles driving on public
roads (e.g. [2], [3]) still require a human driver and/or external
supervisor(s) to monitor the driving performance and to allow
manual intervention if the vehicle behaves in an unsafe way.
As a result, current production systems have to be considered
SAE Level 2 systems. Until highly or even fully automated
vehicles are ready for series deployment, manufacturers must
ensure that the vehicles are safe in all regards of the complex
driving task. Thus, for higher levels of automation, the system
must be aware of its performance limits in other words be self-
aware at the functional as well as on the technical level [4],
[5]. Self-awareness means, that the vehicle must not only be
aware of its external context (other vehicles, infrastructure,
etc.), but also of its internal state in order to relate the vehicle’s
current performance to the system’s performance limits. When
it comes to designing such systems, a development process is
required, which provides means to seamlessly integrate the
development of monitoring mechanisms.
Regarding the development process, the ISO 26262 standard
defines the state-of-the-art for functional safety of E/E-systems
in automotive applications [6]. During the concept phase of
the development process from the ISO 26262 standard, a
hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) based on expert
knowledge has to be conducted to identify and classify hazards
originating from the considered system. For fully automated
vehicles, this is particularly challenging, as the category of
controllability for the driver during risk assessment is not
applicable, as the driver is not present in the vehicle’s control
loop. Controllability for surrounding traffic participants is
difficult to determine without a detailed scenario description.
From the resulting hazardous scenarios (definition according
to [7]) safety goals have to be derived which yield top-level
functional safety requirements. Afterwards, requirements for
functional components in the system must be identified and
further detailed to derive technical safety measures. Monitor-
ing is a key enabler for automated vehicles and must supervise
the system’s adherence to the derived safety and technical
requirements during operation.
This contribution will summarize recent activities at the
Institute of Control Engineering of TU Braunschweig towards
a specification of an ISO-26262-conforming concept phase
for safe self-aware automated vehicles as well as strategies
for runtime monitoring. Examples from two current public
research projects at the institute are utilized to describe the
concept phase of a development process and how the results
from the different process steps can be used to set up a
framework for runtime monitoring and self-awareness.
The project Controlling Concurrent Change (CCC)1 aims
at the design of model-based methods and mechanisms for
runtime based integration processes. One project goal is to
develop a middleware which implements these methods. At
the same time it provides monitoring at different system levels
which is required to supervise vehicle operation on the road.
1http://ccc-project.org/
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The project Unmanned Protective Vehicle for Highway
Hard Shoulder Road Works (aFAS2) serves as an example
for the design phase. aFAS aims at developing an unmanned
protective vehicle which is able to operate without human
supervision on the hard shoulder (SAE Level 4). A more
detailed outline of the project is presented by Stolte et al. [8].
II. PROJECT AFAS
A major cause of fatalities of road workers in Germany are
trucks crashing into the protective vehicle on the hard shoulder.
This is a main motivation for the development of an unmanned,
fully automated protective vehicle. In the project context, the
consortium has produced results which are demanded by the
concept phase of the ISO 26262 standard. The concept of the
protective vehicle includes four operating modes (cf. Fig. 1).
At the beginning of operation (black circle), the protective
vehicle will be driven manually to the construction site. From
Manual Mode, the operator can change the system’s state
to Safe Halt. Safe Halt is considered the safe state of the
protective vehicle. This has proven to be an enabling factor of
the project, as for automated vehicles with a wider range of
functions, it is difficult to define a safe state for every possible
scenario [4]. Stopping is an applicable safety maneuver in any
scenario for the planned use-case due to the low velocity and
the limited area of operation.
Vehicle Guidance System active
Coupled
Mode
Follow
Mode
Safe
Halt
Manual
Mode
Fig. 1. Operating modes of the unmanned protective vehicle
In this operating mode the protective vehicle is slowed
down to and eventually kept in standstill. Safe Halt also
acts as the transition point into automated operating modes
Coupled Mode and Follow Mode. On- and off-ramps are
passed in Coupled Mode because they differ from normal
operation on a hard shoulder and are more challenging for the
vehicle’s perception system. In Coupled Mode the protective
vehicle is virtually coupled to the motion of the leading
vehicle and follows its trajectory without consideration of lane
markings. This virtual drawbar is implemented by vehicle-to-
vehicle communication between the leading and the protective
vehicle. The main operating mode for safeguarding on the
hard shoulder is Follow Mode. In Follow Mode the protective
vehicle follows the left lane marking of the hard shoulder and
keeps a distance to the leading vehicle of about 80 to 100 m.
2This abbreviation is derived from the German project name.
Due to regulations from UN-ECE R79, the velocity of the
protective vehicle is limited to 10 km/h.
After having defined the functional range and the oper-
ational environment in the item definition, a HARA was
conducted, as demanded in the ISO 26262 standard. This
yielded 59 hazardous scenarios and 17 resulting safety goals.
As this contribution aims at proposing methods for different
parts of a development process, we choose one safety goal for
the Follow Mode as a use-case.
One of the obvious hazards is the protective vehicle crossing
(multiple) lanes on the highway and entering moving traffic.
This hazard can manifest in two different ways: Table I shows
the corresponding safety goals which were chosen to mitigate
(1) and eliminate (2) this hazard in the safety concept.
TABLE I
HAZARDOUS EVENTS FOR PROTECTIVE VEHICLE ENTERING TRAFFIC,
RELATED SAFETY GOALS AND AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVELS.
Hazardous Event Safety Goal ASIL
(1) Protective vehicle enters Limit left lock D
moving traffic with full to 3◦.
left lock (maximal steering an-
gle).
(2) Protective vehicle enters Always maintain a B
moving traffic with limited safe distance to
left lock. the left lane marking.
The Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) is a com-
bined classification of severity of potential harm, the exposure
of the driving scenario and the controllability of the hazardous
event [6, Part 3]. In case of the protective vehicle controllabil-
ity levels have to be differentiated by the capability of other
traffic participants to control the hazardous event, as there is no
driver or permanent supervisor available for the vehicle. The
first hazardous event, the protective vehicle entering moving
traffic with full left lock, is classified as ASIL D because
• the hazardous event can cause a fatal crash with multiple
cars and high relative velocities (severity S3),
• the driving scenario is the most common for this vehicle
(exposure E4), and
• a fast crossing protective vehicle is hard to control for
other traffic participants (controllability C3).
This hazardous event can be mitigated by limiting steering
left lock in Follow Mode to 3◦ as stated in the first safety
goal. A limited maximal steering angle leads to a reduced
lateral velocity. When the protective vehicle is entering moving
traffic with reduced lateral velocity, the hazardous event can
be classified as ASIL B due to better controllability for other
traffic participants (controllability C1). Turns on highways
typically provide large radii, such that the protective vehicle
can follow all turns with the demanded limited left lock. For
this safety goal an ASIL D hard- and/or software system can
be implemented with manageable effort. As the final safety
concept shall not only mitigate but eliminate system level
hazards, the mitigated hazard must be reclassified with the
assumption that the limitation is implemented. To eliminate
this hazard, we introduce the safety goal to always maintain
a safe distance to the lane marking of the hard shoulder.
For the following parts of this contribution we choose this
second hazard and the corresponding safety goal to exemplify
how to derive further safety requirements and how to use these
requirements in online monitoring to maintain a safe operation.
III. PROJECT CONTROLLING CONCURRENT CHANGE
As described above, current automotive systems are devel-
oped according to the ISO 26262 standard, which proposes
a V-model-like development process. Following the V-model,
the aforementioned functional specification from the aFAS
project is located in the upper left part of the ”V”. While aFAS
is following a rather classic implementation of the V-model
(specification, implementation, integration, test), the project
CCC aims at facilitating the integration process in the right
branch of the V-Model, particularly with regard to the addition
of updates at runtime.
Due to the complexity of modern automotive systems con-
sisting of an increasing number of system components, the
verification of a complete system is becoming more and more
complex and time-consuming. Integration tests in particular
often show the outcome of hidden dependencies between the
requirements for single system components, which makes the
integration of updated components even more challenging.
CCC aims at an automated model-based integration process for
safety-critical embedded systems which includes automated
analysis of the aforementioned dependencies. For this purpose,
the system is modeled from a variety of viewpoints (e.g. func-
tion, timing, platform) using the corresponding requirements
as a basis. However, as not all side-effects, which occur during
operation, can be anticipated in the design process, monitoring
mechanisms are instantiated at runtime.
In this paper, we describe skills and abilities as one of the
models applied at the functional viewpoint which is used in the
project context. In the context of the aFAS use-case we present
a knowledge-based approach for the derivation of performance
metrics for abilities.
IV. CONCEPT OF SKILLS AND ABILITIES
The basic idea behind the skill and ability based represen-
tation is to model the system along the human driving task
at a functional level. Dependencies (edges) between skills and
abilities (nodes) are expressed in the form of a directed acyclic
graph. The main concept and its origins have been described
by Reschka et al. [9]. Further literature on the need for an
internal representation of the system’s performance can also
be found in [5].
This can yield a representation of what the system must
do how well for fulfilling its functional specification. In this
context we would like to correct a translation error (reversed
terms ability and skill) which occurred in [9], originating
from a misinterpretation of a German source [10]. For correct
translation, we refer the definition of skills and abilities for
technical systems given by Reschka [11]:
Definition 1: A skill describes an activity of a technical
system which has to be executed to fulfill the defined goals
of the system (translated from German).
Definition 2: An ability describes the quality level of
an activity dependent on internal properties and the current
operational situation of the system (translated from German).
The differentiation between skills and abilities allows to
apply the concept to the development phase (skill graph,
Section V) and the use phase (ability graph, Section VI) of the
system (nomenclature of phases according to [12, Chap. 3].
In this context, the skill graph can be used to derive safety
and technical requirements. The requirements can then be
attributed to skills in the skill graph as annotations of the
outgoing edges of a skill. For instantiating the ability graph
at runtime, expressive metrics for performance monitoring are
required. In combination with the requirements derived for
the skill graph, these metrics yield the basis for determining a
performance level for each ability node in the graph at runtime.
The performance level of an ability is represented by the edge
weight of the incoming edge and consists of the performance
levels annotated to the outgoing dependency edges.
The following sections will present possible applications
of skills and abilities in the development and use phase in
more detail. If not mentioned otherwise, we use terms defined
by Avizienis et al. [12] and focus on the safety aspect in
the given taxonomy of dependability. For the derivation of
safety requirements, we draw the system boundary around the
vehicle. In consequence we propose an extension of the terms
given in [12]: Avizienis et al. define behavior as a sequence
of states. The external state of a system is defined as ”the part
of the provider’s total state that is perceivable at the service
interface” [12, p. 3]. Based on this, we differentiate internal
and external behavior, as a sequence of internal and external
states, respectively. As a result, the internal behavior describes
what the system does internally to fulfill its function, while the
external behavior is the behavior which directly influences
other traffic participants and can thus cause hazards.
V. SKILLS IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
The ISO 26262 standard demands the formulation of func-
tional descriptions and concepts for a functional safety concept
without giving details of technical solutions. With this demand,
the resulting concepts can be reused in further stages of devel-
opment and assessed by external reviewers without struggling
with a flood of information. Fig. 2 shows a shortened overview
over steps in the concept phase.
Vehicle Level Hazard
Analysis
Vehicle level hazardsRisk assessment
Item Definition: 
Functional range and
System boundaries
Safety goals Functional safety concept
Fig. 2. Top-down development process
Reschka [11] proposes to use skill graphs in the item
definition which is the first step in the development phase.
After creating a use case description, the level of automation
is determined. Followed by this, operational scenarios, the
Radar Camera Steering systemPowertrainBrake systemInertial sensors
YawAccelerateDecelarateEstimate motion
Perceive
hard shoulder
marking
Perceive
movable objects
Estimate angle
& distance
to marking
Select
target object
Control lateral
dynamics
Control
longitudinal
dynamics
Follow hard
shoulder
Keep
distance to
leading vehicle
Follow mode
Fig. 3. Skills for follow mode with categories main (grey), observable external behavior (yellow), perception (green), planning (light blue), action (orange),
sensors (blue), actuators (red). Examplatory path for structured derivation of performance metrics from safety goals is depicted by red frames.
intended behavior, and safe states for each scenario must be
described. To cluster and describe operational scenarios of the
vehicle, maneuvers can be used to express the behavior of
vehicles from an external point of view.
Reschka also proposes a list of driving maneuvers to cover
possible traffic scenarios based on literature review and further
refinements towards automated vehicles. Each maneuver can
be expressed by physical measures (vehicle A going faster
than vehicle B) and semantic relations (lane change from right
to left). Therefore maneuvers describe the external behavior
of the vehicle. Which maneuvers have to be fulfilled by the
vehicle can be derived from the intended use case and the
operational scenarios. The chosen maneuvers can then be
modeled using skill graphs. This model shall be independent
from specific situations which the vehicle could encounter at
run-time. Skill graphs can provide information how a system
is able to fulfill the driving task and which dependencies exist
between the system’s skills in a functional manner. In this
context, external behavior is characterized by skills which are
in direct relation to the described top-level function (cf. Fig. 3).
The majority of skills in the skill graph describe the internal
behavior of the system.
Bagschik et al. [13] used skill graphs combined with
computer-aided generation of operational scenarios to derive
potentially hazardous scenarios according to the designed use
case. This analysis was conducted without any technical details
of implementation. One resulting skill graph was designed for
the maneuver of following the hard shoulder in the state Follow
Mode. Each skill from the graphs in the item definition was
assigned to the category main, sense, plan or act (cf. Fig. 3).
As the ISO 26262 standard formulates that the HARA “is
based on the item’s functional behavior; therefore, the detailed
design of the item does not necessarily need to be known.” [6,
Chap. 3.72] We further define that the mentioned functional
behavior is the external behavior of the item.
The main item for assessment is called AFA-logic as
described by Stolte et al. [7] and describes the service provided
by the system on the top-level. Thus, we have to identify which
external system states are hazardous in each possible operating
scenario of the item. As mentioned above, the identification
of the resulting hazardous scenarios which result from the
external behavior of the system, yields the basis for safety
goals for the external behavior. This directly relates the list
of functional safety requirements (cf. Fig 4) to the externally
visible behavioral skills (cf. Fig 3). For the underlying skills,
more specific technical requirements can be derived in order
to fulfill those functional safety requirements.
The given safety goal always maintain a safe distance to the
left lane marking would thus entail an exemplary functional
safety requirement of the form the vehicle must always keep
a distance of at least 0.28 m from the left lane marking when
following the hard shoulder for the skill follow hard shoulder.
For the underlying skill control lateral dynamics, this would
translate to a control-performance metric of the form: the
lateral controller must guarantee a maximal overshoot of
0.28 m. These requirements must be met during operation
of the vehicle for guaranteeing safe operation. A concept
for monitoring (safety-related) system performance will be
presented in the next section.
Results of hazard analysis
and risk assessment
Safety goal 1
ASIL
Safety goal 2
ASIL
Safety goal N
ASIL
Functional safety
requirement
Assigned
ASIL
Allocated to
subsystem
Functional safety
requirement
Assigned
ASIL
Allocated to
subsystem
…
Fig. 4. Relation of HARA, safety goals and functional safety requirements
according to [6].
VI. ABILITIES FOR ONLINE PERFORMANCE MONITORING
For runtime monitoring of the system’s performance, the
skill graphs derived in the development process can be trans-
formed into ability graphs. The challenge for monitoring per-
formance in specific situations at run-time is to find expressive
metrics even if metrics from different domains are combined
for calculating a level of performance.
Abilities can consist of multiple interacting software com-
ponents which makes them a (sub-)system, according to [12].
As performance is measured at the interfaces of these sub-
systems, the performance attributed to abilities can be defined
as quality of service (service cf. [12, p. 3]).
In the field of (autonomic) grid computing, substantial re-
search effort has been spent in recent years to create structured
approaches towards a meaningful computation of quality of
service in heterogeneous computing systems. For this pur-
pose, knowledge-based approaches have been developed which
apply ontologies (formally ordered representations of terms,
obects and their relations) as a basis for knowledge represen-
tation (cf. [14] for an overview). Possible applications range
from a specification of quality of service during design- and
runtime to reasoning about the quality of composed services
[15]. These applications are in line with the development
process for self-aware automated vehicles which has been
proposed in the sections above.
For our application, ontologies provide means to model
performance measures for each skill and incorporate identi-
fied safety goals and resulting requirements for the abilities.
Additionally, an ontology extending the semantics of the
ability graphs allows to define mappings between the vehicle’s
abilities and software components implementing the respective
ability. With this connection it is possible to explicitly define
redundancies within the system to support degradation strate-
gies. As ontologies provide a formal description of entities and
their relations, they also enable reasoning about sensible com-
binations of entities at runtime. Considering reconfigurable
systems, as in the CCC project, the relations can be used
as a basis to synthesize redundant (software-)sub-systems and
corresponding quality metrics at runtime.
However, simply propagating metrics from lower levels
unchanged through the graph adds little to no value to the
monitoring on higher levels. Instead, we aggregate lower level
metrics to composed metrics on higher levels which allows
us to add a weight to each metric and prioritize certain
aspects over others during monitoring. During composition,
it must be ensured that metrics remain expressive for effective
monitoring. To ensure this, we equip each metric with a history
of the metrics it was composed of and utilize this history for
the composition of metrics on higher levels of the graph.
Within the ontology, we differentiate between abilities and
metrics as shown in Fig. 5 a), although slightly simplified for
more clarity. An ability depicts a node in the ability graph
and can depend on other abilities within the graph which is
specified by a dependency relation. A dependency relation is
required for each ability to reflect the edges of the graph as
shown in Fig. 3. It can be described by its type, i.e. whether
the ability node is the main node, a sub node, a data sink,
or a data source. A category can be assigned in analogy to
the skill graph, i.e. by grouping the nodes into visible external
behavior, perception, planning, action, sensors, and actuators.
Each ability has a performance level, and a dedicated mapping
regarding the software component(s) which implement this
ability and thus provide data for associated performance met-
rics. An ability can have one or several metrics from which the
performance level is determined. Each metric can be grouped
by whether it is a composed metric or an atomic metric.
In addition to their composition history composed metrics
are attributed with information about their composition rules
in order to avoid fusion of correlated metrics. Still, finding
appropriate and meaningful metrics for each ability and graph
level, aggregation measures, as well as models for performance
propagation poses a challenging task and is subject to ongoing
research. From the safety goals identified in section II, we
derive metrics for the main ability Follow mode and the visible
behavior ability Follow hard shoulder. On the highest level
Follow mode the identified safety goal of Do not drive into
traffic must be adhered to at all times. Thus, it is essential
to monitor whether the vehicle enters or is about to enter
traffic of the rightmost lane of the motorway. Based on this,
the safety goal for the ability Follow hard shoulder consists
of maintaining a safe distance to the lane markings of the
hard shoulder at all times. To derive monitoring metrics from
this safety goal we need to define what constitutes a minimal
safe distance. Thus, it must be evaluated whether the current
distance to the lane markings lies within a specified range
below the safe distance of 0.28 m.
In our case, the requirements have been defined in the item
definition as stated in section V. The technical safety require-
ment for control of the lateral verhicle dynamics implies the
need for monitoring the overshoot of the control algorithms
and check whether it stays within the predefined range. As
the control algorithms are dependent on the estimated angle
and distance to the perceived lane markings, these estimations
must provide some measure of uncertainty, e.g. the variance
of the estimation. The obvious metric derived from this safety
goal is to monitor whether the variance falls within a specified
range to stay within the bounds of the hard shoulder. It
should also be known whether the variance estimation is
optimistic or pessimistic. Considering the perception of the
lane markings, we require a representation of invalid results
meaning a plausibility check must be performed to determine
validity of the detected markings and to detect when existing
markings were not detected.
Fig. 5 b) shows parts of a performance metric ontology
which can be used for monitoring the control algorithms
within the graph. This part of the ontology can be seen as
a generalization and further specification of the class hierar-
chy presented in [16]. In our example, this set of available
performance metrics would be applied to monitor control of
the lateral dynamics of the vehicle. A meaningful performance
level can e.g. be calculated by comparing the actual steady
PerformanceMetric
Overshoot
RiseTime
ControlError
SettlingTime
Value Unit
ControlMetric
ControlSurface
IntegratedControlErrorSteadyStateOffset
AbsoluteControlError
hasUnit
isA
isA
isA
isA
hasValue
isA
isA
isA
isA
isA
Ability
SWComponent
AbilityCategory
AbilityType
PerformanceLevel
String
PerformanceMetric
MetricHistory
MetricType
MetricCategory
ComposedMetric
AtomicMetric
hasAbilityCategory
hasMetricHistory
hasPerformanceMetric
hasPerformanceLevel
hasAbilityType
hasSWComponent
isA
hasMetricType
isA
hasMetricHistory
isComposedFrom
hasNamehasName
hasDependencyOn
Classes and object properties for an ontology describing
abilities and corresponding performance metrics
a) Exemplary ontology for metrics addressing
control quality
b)
Fig. 5. Ontologies for structured derivation of performance metrics
state offset during operation with the maximal allowed steady
state offset from the corresponding requirement (0.28 m).
Summarizing, the proposed ontology provides means for
transforming skill graphs into ability graphs for runtime per-
formance monitoring by providing additional semantics for
metrics and performance. The approach of deriving metrics
and thresholds from identified safety goals provides a useful
method to aid in this process.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have outlined how skill and ability graphs can provide a
valuable method for modeling the vehicle’s capabilities in the
development process while also enabling online monitoring.
Employing skill graphs in the item definition allows the
derivation of metrics for runtime monitoring directly from
the safety goals identified in the HARA. Thus, since safety
goals are defined for the externally visible vehicle behavior,
we distinguish external from internal system behavior.
Although ontologies can provide means for derivation and
synthesis of performance metrics, it must be mentioned that
their power must not be overstated (cf. [15]). They do not pro-
vide ready-made solutions, but should be considered as a tool
for coming to solutions in the task of introducing expressive
monitoring mechanisms from a functional viewpoint.
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